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THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY AND 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
Roberto Iraola* 
Under the doctrine of specialty, recognized by the Supreme Court 
over a century ago in United States v. Rauscher,1 an extradited fugitive is 
subject to prosecution only for those offenses for which he or she was 
surrendered.2  This doctrine or rule “fundamentally bears on treaty 
obligations between states; the principle operates to ensure that the 
receiving state does not abuse the extradition processes of the extraditing 
state.”3 
As federal case law on the application of the doctrine of specialty has 
evolved, the limitation it imposes has been routinely incorporated in 
extradition treaties4 and recognized by statute,5 and has been tested 
                                                 
* Roberto Iraola, J.D. 1983, Catholic University Law School, Trial Attorney, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs.  The views expressed herein are those 
of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Justice 
or the United States. 
1 119 U.S. 407 (1886). 
2 Id.  In Rauscher, Great Britain surrendered a fugitive to the United States so that he 
could be prosecuted for murder.  Id.  Rather than try him for murder, however, the United 
States prosecuted him for assaulting and inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on the 
victim, a lesser included offense of murder which was not listed in the extradition treaty.  
Id. at 432.  In vacating the conviction, the Court in Rauscher held: 
[A] person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of the court, 
by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty, can only be tried 
for one of the offenses described in that treaty, and for the offense with 
which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition, until a 
reasonable time and opportunity have been given him, after his release 
or trial upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum 
he had been forcibly taken under those proceedings. 
Id. at 430.  Applying the principle of comity, the Court ruled that the treaty contained an 
implied specialty clause.  Id. at 420.  Thus, the decision has been interpreted to hold “that 
when an extradition treaty is silent on the issue of specialty, the doctrine will be implied 
into the treaty’s terms as long as the record indicates that the two countries that made the 
treaty would follow the rules of comity in the absence of a treaty.”  Timothy McMichael, 
Note, Born to Run:  The Supreme Court of Washington’s Misapplication of the Doctrine of 
Specialty in State v. Pang, 74 WASH. L. REV. 191, 198 (1999). 
3 Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 525 (1988); see United States v. Andonian, 
29 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The doctrine is based on principles of international 
comity:  to protect its own citizens in prosecutions abroad, the United States guarantees 
that it will honor limitations placed on prosecutions in the United States.”). 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Knowles, 2007 WL 1246026, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“The 
extradition treaty between the United States and the Bahamas incorporates the doctrine.”).  
See generally Speedy Rice & Renee Luke, U.S. Courts, The Death Penalty, and the Doctrine of 
Specialty:  Enforcement in the Heart of Darkness, 2 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1061, 1065 (2002) 
(“[Rauscher’s  holding] is typically integrated into extradition treaties.”). 
5 See 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (2000) (“The Secretary of State may order the person 
committed . . . to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government, to be 
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when evidence is introduced at trial or a jury instruction is given relating 
to an offense or offenses for which extradition6 was denied or not sought, 
and also, when evidence of such offenses is considered by the court at 
sentencing.7  Additionally, questions concerning the application of this 
doctrine have arisen when, in turning over a fugitive, the requested 
country has made reference in its surrender decree to the limitation on 
the maximum sentence which may be imposed. 
This Article, which is divided into three parts, examines the 
developing federal case law with respect to these questions.8  First, this 
Article considers whether a fugitive has the right under an extradition 
treaty to assert a violation of the rule of specialty, or whether this is a 
right reserved to the rendering country.  Next, the Article examines how 
courts have addressed challenges to the government’s mode of proof and 
theory of criminal liability when these affect offenses for which 
extradition was either denied or not sought.  Finally, this Article 
discusses the consideration of criminal offenses at sentencing outside 
those for which extradition was granted, and also addresses attempts by 
the state that surrenders the fugitive to limit the maximum sentence 
which may be imposed on such fugitive if ultimately convicted of the 
offense(s) for which extradition was granted. 
I.  STANDING TO RAISE RULE OF SPECIALTY 
It is not uncommon for a defendant who has been extradited to the 
United States to attempt to have the charge(s) against him dismissed, or 
to otherwise limit the scope of the government’s evidence at trial, by 
invoking the rule of specialty.  The first question presented when 
considering such a challenge revolves around the defendant’s standing 
                                                                                                             
tried for the offense of which charged.”).  See also Benitez v. Garcia, 419 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 
1246 (S.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 459 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Following Rauscher, many 
treaties . . . were drafted to specifically incorporate the specialty doctrine.  The United 
States also adopted the doctrine in 18 U.S.C. § 3186 . . . . ”); Rice & Luke, supra note 4, at 
1065 (“The doctrine is now implicitly recognized by federal statute.”). 
6 Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902).  Extradition involves “the surrender by one 
nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own 
territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try 
and to punish him, demands the surrender.”  Id. at 289. 
7 United States v. Ditommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1987).  Courts “have narrowly 
construed the doctrine of specialty by limiting Rauscher’s holding to cases involving a 
formal extradition pursuant to [a] treaty.”  Id.; see United  States v. Trujillo, 871 F. Supp. 
215, 219 (D. Del. 1994) (“It seems clear to the Court that the Doctrine of Specialty applies to 
extradited individuals.  In this case, [defendant] was not extradited.”).  
8 See United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Unless 
otherwise directed by treaty or statute, [courts] will look to United States precedent to 
understand and apply the specialty doctrine.”). 
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to raise this claim, an issue about which the courts are not in agreement.9  
The Tenth Circuit, for example, has held that a defendant has an 
unqualified right to raise a specialty claim.10  The Second,11 Third,12 and 
Seventh13 Circuits, on the other hand, have held that only the parties to 
the extradition treaty may raise such a claim.14  The Eighth,15 Ninth,16 
                                                 
9 See Rice & Luke, supra note 4, at 1081 (“Standing decisions fall into three categories:  
(1) cases holding that an extradited defendant has unlimited standing to raise a violation of 
the doctrine of specialty claim; (2) cases holding that an extradited defendant has limited 
standing; and (3) cases holding that an extradited defendant has no standing 
whatsoever.”); Jacques Semmelman, The Doctrine of Specialty in the Federal Courts:  Making 
Sense of United States v. Rauscher, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 71, 137–40 (1993) (discussing conflict). 
10 See United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990) (relying on Rauscher for 
the proposition that defendant had “standing to raise [a doctrine of specialty challenge]”).  
See generally John J. Barrett  III, Note, The Doctrine of Specialty:  A  Traditional Approach to the 
Issue of Standing, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 299, 302 (1997) (“In the Tenth [C]ircuit, 
individuals have the right to assert violations of specialty regardless [of] whether the 
requested sovereign can raise a violation of the doctrine.”). 
11 See Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir. 1973) (“As a matter of  
international law, the principle of specialty has been viewed as a privilege of the asylum 
state, designed to protect its dignity and interests, rather than a right accruing to the 
accused.”); United States v. Nosov, 153 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Decisions 
from the Second Circuit—the binding authority for this court—suggest that a defendant 
would not have standing to invoke the rule of specialty.”).  But see United States v. Cuevas, 
496 F.3d 256, 262 (2d Cir. 2007) (“This Court has not conclusively decided whether a 
defendant has standing to challenge his sentence on the ground that it violates the terms of 
the treaty or decree authorizing his extradition.”); Antwi v. United States, 349 F.Supp. 2d 
663, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The Second Circuit has not decided whether defendants have 
standing to raise claims based on alleged violations of extradition treaty provisions relating 
to the principles of specialty and dual criminality.”) (footnote omitted).  See also United 
States v. Martonak, 187 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that defendant had 
standing to raise specialty claim to the extent that the surrendering country did not 
contend otherwise). 
12 See United States ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia, 109 F.3d 165, 168 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Had 
[petitioner] brought suit invoking the [extradition] treaty or the Rule of Specialty, she 
would lack standing.”). 
13 See United States v. Munoz-Solarte, 28 F.3d 1217, 1994 WL 375334 at *2 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(“Even if their extraditions violated the doctrines of specialty . . . [defendants] lack standing 
to object to these violations.”); United States v. Burke, 425 F. 3d 400, 408 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(“[Extradition treaties] create rules for the relations between nations.”).  See also Matta-
Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990) (“It is well established that 
individuals have no standing to challenge violations of international treaties in the absence 
of a protest by the sovereigns involved.”). 
14 See Kenneth E. Levitt, Note, International Extradition, the Principle of Specialty, and 
Effective Treaty Enforcement, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1017, 1033 (1992)  (“Courts which deny 
defendants standing reason that because the principle of specialty exists to protect only the 
surrendering state, only the surrendering state may insist on strict adherence to 
specialty.”). 
15 See United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 n.5 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The government’s 
argument that [defendant] lacked standing to complain of a violation of the treaty is 
without merit.”). 
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and Eleventh17 Circuits have taken a middle ground and held that a 
defendant may raise the issue if the sending state would have standing 
to raise the claim as well.18  Finally, the First,19 Fourth,20 Fifth,21 Sixth,22 
and District of Columbia Circuits23 have recognized the split but have 
not expressed an opinion.  As a practical matter, even in circuits that 
have rejected the argument that a defendant has standing to raise a rule 
of specialty challenge, or that have not expressed an opinion, courts 
                                                                                                             
16 See United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (“An extradited 
person may raise whatever objections the extraditing country is entitled to raise.”). 
17 See United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1995) (“We hold that a 
criminal defendant has standing to allege a violation of the principle of specialty.  We limit, 
however, the defendant’s challenges under the principle of specialty to only those 
objections that the rendering country might have brought.”). 
18 The district court in United States v. Bowe, 841 F. Supp. 1160, 1165 (S.D. Fla. 1993), aff’d 
229 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2000), explained the test this way: 
[A]lthough a defendant has standing to assert those objections which 
could be asserted by the extraditing state, he is merely serving as a 
surrogate for the state, and an objection by the extraditing state itself 
would clearly be owed greater deference in the determination of 
whether that state considered the rule to have been violated. 
Id. at 1165; see Eric P. Wempen, Note, United States v. Puentes:  Re-Examining Extradition 
Law and the Specialty Doctrine, 1 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 151, 167 (1995) (“[T]his approach 
assumes that the surrendering nation’s silence amounts to an objection which is expressed 
by the defendant.”).  See also Rice & Luke, supra note 4, at 1082 (“Although this position 
expressly limits the rights of the extradited defendants, these courts justify such a 
limitation because it preserves the contractual, and hence diplomatic, relationship between 
the two countries.”). 
19 See United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 767, n.6 (1st Cir. 1995) (“We need not probe 
the matter of standing . . . .”). 
20 See United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 1992) (“This court has not yet 
addressed the issue and, on the facts of this case, we decline to do so.”). 
21 See United States v. Angleton, 2006 WL 2828657, at *4 n.12 (5th Cir. 2006) (“It is still an 
open question in this circuit whether a criminal defendant has standing to assert the rule of 
specialty.”); United States v. LeBaron, 156 F.3d 621, 627 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Whether 
[defendant] has standing to raise the doctrine of specialty is an undecided issue in this 
circuit.”); United States v. Miro, 29 F.3d 194, 200 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (while considering a 
challenge under the rule of specialty, the court questioned whether defendant had standing 
to raise the issue since Spain had not objected).  But see United States v. Quirox, 2005 WL 
1427692, at * 3 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005) (“This Court’s decision in U.S. v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242, 
243 (5th Cir. 1989), precludes a criminal defendant from arguing the Specialty Doctrine 
when the asylum state[] . . . has failed to raise an objection to the proceeding.”). 
22 See United States v. Garrido-Santana, 360 F.3d 565, 578 n.10 (6th Cir. 2004) (“This 
circuit has not expressly decided whether an extradited individual has standing to seek the 
enforcement of th[e] [specialty] rule.”).  See also Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584 
(6th Cir. 1985) (Recognizing that “[t]he right to insist on [the] application of the principle of 
specialty belongs to the requested state, not to the individual whose extradition is 
requested[,]” but addressing merits of claim), vacated on other grounds, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 
1993). 
23 See United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 892 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (acknowledging 
conflict but declining to take a position because defendant’s arguments lacked merit). 
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often will review such claims.24  Therefore, we now turn to a discussion 
of rule of specialty challenges in the context of the scope of proof at trial, 
the government’s theory of liability, and sentencing. 
II.  SPECIALTY AND THE SCOPE OF PROOF AT TRIAL 
The rule of specialty does not affect the scope of proof at trial with 
respect to the charges for which a requested state grants extradition,25 
nor the giving of jury instructions on theories of criminal liability related 
to offenses for which extradition was granted or denied.26  Cases 
addressing these issues are discussed below. 
A. Evidence of Offenses for Which Extradition Was Denied as Predicate Acts 
or to Prove Participation in a Charged Conspiracy 
In United States v. Saccoccia,27 the defendant was extradited from 
Switzerland on an indictment charging him with participating in a 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) 
conspiracy, failing to file currency transaction reports (“CTRs”), illegally 
structuring monetary transactions in order to avoid transaction reporting 
requirements, using property derived from unlawful activities while 
engaging in transactions affecting interstate commerce, money 
laundering, and Travel Act violations.28  The Swiss authorities granted 
the extradition request on all charges, except for sixty-seven counts 
which pertained to the failure to file CTRs and the illegal structuring of 
monetary transactions in order to avoid currency transaction reporting 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., LeBaron, 156 F.3d at 627 (“We need not decide this issue because, even 
assuming arguendo that [defendant] has standing to challenge jurisdiction, we find that 
prosecution on the four counts did not violate the doctrine.”); United States v. Nosov, 153 
F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The court, however, need not consider th[e] issue [of 
standing] in great detail, because even if [defendant] had standing, his argument would 
fail.”).  But see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (“Standing to 
sue is part of the common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case.”). 
25 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402, 1414 (11th Cir. 1989) (“When 
a grand jury indicts a defendant, and the defendant is tried for the precise offense 
contained in the extradition order, the doctrine of specialty does not purport to regulate the 
scope of proof admissible in the judicial forum of the requisitioning state.”).  See also United 
States v. Munoz-Solarte, 28 F.3d 1217, 1994 WL 375334, at *2 (7th Cir. 1994).  If the 
defendant was arrested under a provisional arrest warrant, the doctrine of specialty does 
not require that the charges underlying such request be identical to those for which the 
defendant is later tried.  Id. 
26 See, e.g., Gallo-Chamorro v. United States, 233 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d 502 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146 (8th 
Cir. 1987). 
27 58 F.3d 754 (1st Cir. 1995). 
28 Id. at 764–65. 
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requirements.29  After his surrender, a superseding indictment was 
returned against the defendant for charges which closely paralleled 
those in the original indictment.30  The United States provided the 
superseding indictment to the Swiss authorities and they agreed that the 
defendant’s extradition had been granted with respect to the facts 
charging him with participating in a RICO conspiracy.31 
On appeal, following his convictions under the RICO and Travel Act 
counts, the defendant argued that these convictions could not stand 
because, in violation of the rule of specialty, the CTR offenses for which 
he had not been extradited had served as predicate acts for these 
offenses.32  Rejecting this contention, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit began its analysis noting that, as a general 
proposition, it was difficult to envision “a violation of the principle of 
specialty where the requesting nation prosecute[d] the returned fugitive 
for the exact crimes on which the surrendering nation granted 
extradition.”33  In this case, the court observed, the Swiss authorities had 
“twice approved [defendant]’s extradition on counts that prominently 
featured CTR offenses as predicates.”34  Furthermore, the indictment 
under which the defendant ultimately was tried removed all references 
to CTR offenses, and the jury was instructed that it should not consider 
whether the defendant had committed any CTR offenses.35 
The rule of specialty also has been interpreted not to foreclose the 
admission of evidence relating to offenses for which extradition was 
                                                 
29 Id. at 765. 
30 Id. at 765 n.5. 
31 Id. at 765. 
32 Id. at 767–68. 
33 Id. at 768. 
34 Id.  The court in Saccoccia reasoned: 
This approval—to which we must pay the substantial deference that is 
due to a surrendering court’s resolution of questions pertaining to 
extraditability[]—strongly suggests that the RICO and Travel Act 
counts, despite their mention of predicates which, standing alone, 
would not support extradition, are compatible with the criminal laws 
of both jurisdictions.  Though a Swiss official may informally have 
fretted about the prospect of a RICO or Travel Act conviction based on 
nonextraditable predicates, we are reluctant to conclude on this 
gossamer showing that the [Swiss Federal Tribunal] did not know and 
appreciate the clearly expressed contents of the indictment when it 
sanctioned extradition. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
35 Id.; accord United States v. Moss, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147–48 (W.D. Tenn. 2004) 
(denying the defense’s motion to dismiss counts in the indictment charging RICO 
substantive and conspiracy charges, as well as forfeiture, because they were based on 
money laundering charges for which Costa Rican authorities had denied extradition, 
reasoning that under Saccoccia, these offenses could be used as predicate acts). 
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denied when the defendant had been extradited on a narcotics 
conspiracy charge.  In United States v. Bowe,36 for example, the defendant 
was extradited from the Bahamas on one count of a thirteen-count 
indictment charging him with participating in a narcotics conspiracy.37  
Prior to the start of the trial, the district court dismissed the twelve 
counts for which the Bahamas had not granted extradition, and the 
defendant was convicted of the conspiracy count.38 
On appeal, the defendant argued that his conviction should be 
reversed because, in violation of the rule of specialty, the government 
had introduced evidence relating to the counts for which extradition had 
been denied to prove the conspiracy charge.39  The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was not persuaded.  The court first 
noted that the rule of specialty “d[id] not affect the scope of proof 
admissible at trial for the charges for which extradition was granted,” 
nor did it “alter the forum country’s evidentiary rules[.]”40  The court 
then reasoned that since the defendant had been charged and convicted 
of only the conspiracy count, “for which the Bahamian government 
approved his extradition, the prosecution’s sweeping evidentiary case 
[ha]d] not violate[d] the doctrine of specialty.”41 
B. Evidence Not Presented in Support of Extradition Request for Conspiracy 
Charge  
United States v. Puentes illustrates the principle that courts will not 
interpret the rule of specialty in a manner that restricts the government’s 
proof at trial with respect to a charged conspiracy offense for which 
extradition was granted when the scope of the evidence exceeds that 
which was presented to the requested state.42  In Puentes, Uruguay 
granted the defendant’s extradition under four counts of an indictment, 
one of which charged the defendant with conspiracy to import cocaine 
                                                 
36 221 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2000). 
37 Id. at 1187. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 1191. 
40 Id. (citations omitted). 
41 Id. at 1192; accord United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402, 1413–14 (11th Cir. 
1989) (evidence of money laundering was admissible to prove drug conspiracy for which 
extradition was granted); United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939, 944 (2d Cir. 1976) (evidence 
of defendant’s acts and statements of co-conspirators were admissible to prove conspiracy 
charge for which defendant was extradited, even though they predated period fixed for 
conspiracy in surrender decree); United States v. Knowles, 2007 WL 1246026, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 
2007) (evidence of trafficking offenses which occurred during conspiracy, for which an 
extradition request was denied, was not barred by rule of specialty to establish conspiracy 
offense for which extradition was granted). 
42 50 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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from 1982 to November 29, 1988.43  After the defendant’s surrender, the 
grand jury returned a superseding indictment which increased the 
period of the conspiracy count to three years, from November 29, 1988, 
to December 13, 1991.44  Summarily rejecting the defendant’s contention 
that his conviction had to be reversed because his prosecution, under the 
revised conspiracy charge in the superseding indictment, had violated 
the rule of specialty, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that extending the 
duration of the conspiracy merely broadened the scope of proof that the 
government could submit in support of the charge for which the 
defendant’s extradition had been granted.45 
Similarly, in United States v. Abello-Silva,46 the defendant was 
extradited from Colombia on the basis of a two-count indictment 
charging him with conspiracy to import cocaine and marijuana and 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute these drugs.47  After the 
defendant was extradited to the United States, the grand jury returned a 
superseding indictment which charged the defendant with the identical 
offenses for which he had been extradited, but added more facts 
depicting his illegal activities.48  The defendant was convicted of both 
counts and challenged his conviction on appeal, alleging in part that his 
trial under the superseding indictment had violated the rule of 
specialty.49  In rejecting the defendant’s contention, the Tenth Circuit 
noted that the doctrine of specialty is aimed at “parallel offenses and not 
parallel facts.”50  Furthermore, the court observed, the doctrine 
“specifically recognizes the possibility, for strategic reasons, that the 
evidence introduced at trial was withheld from the extradition request[]” 
because “[t]he specialty principle is not a vehicle for discovery.”51 
In a similar vein, in United States v. Monsalve,52  the defendant was 
extradited from Canada on the basis of a one-count indictment charging 
him with conspiracy to export five kilograms or more of cocaine.53  The 
evidence presented to the Canadian authorities in support of the request, 
and upon which the Canadian authorities relied, consisted of a shipment 
                                                 
43 Id. at 1569. 
44 Id. at 1569–70. 
45 Id. at 1576 (“[W]e do not believe that the superseding indictment materially altered the 
substance of the offense for which Puentes has been extradited.  Count IV of the 
superseding indictment merely . . . extended the conspiratorial period for three years.”). 
46 948 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1991). 
47 Id. at 1171. 
48 Id. at 1172. 
49 Id. at 1171–72. 
50 Id. at 1174. 
51 Id. 
52 173 F.3d 847, 1999 WL 132238 (2d Cir. 1999). 
53 Id. at *1. 
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of approximately twenty-seven kilograms of cocaine.54  At trial and 
subsequently at sentencing, however, the government presented 
evidence linking the defendant to the exportation of approximately 113 
kilograms of cocaine.55  On appeal, the defendant argued that his 
conviction violated the rule of specialty because the evidence presented 
to the Canadian authorities had been limited to the exportation of no 
more than twenty-seven kilograms of cocaine.56  In rejecting this 
contention, the Second Circuit ruled that the defendant had been 
“convicted of exactly the same offense that was charged in the 
indictment[, and] the fact that more evidence was presented at trial and 
during sentencing than was presented to the Canadian authorities [wa]s 
irrelevant.”57 
Finally, in Antwi v. United States,58 the defendant was extradited from 
Ghana on the basis of an indictment charging him with one count of 
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and 
cocaine and counts of distribution and possession with intent to 
distribute heroin.59  The defendant was convicted only of the conspiracy 
count and, following the affirmance of his conviction on appeal, filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that his detention was illegal 
because the affidavit which had been submitted in support of his 
extradition suggested that he was responsible for about $100,000 in 
heroin sales but, in eliciting his conviction, the government had 
presented more evidence at trial.60  The district court denied the petition 
finding that the doctrine of specialty “d[id] not prohibit the requesting 
state from proving in court that the defendant’s commission of the crime 
for which he was extradited was more serious than evidence indicated at 
the time of extradition.”61 
C. Theory of Criminal Liability 
Courts have consistently recognized the limitations inherent in the 
application of the doctrine of specialty when it comes to the 
government’s theory of criminal liability at the time the jury is charged.  
                                                 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id. at *2. 
57 Id.; cf. United States v. Archbold-NewBall, 554 F.2d 665, 684–85 (5th Cir. 1977) (rule of 
specialty did not bar use in United States of evidence obtained in Martinique to prove 
conspiracy offense for which defendants were charged and extradited).  
58 349 F. Supp. 2d 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
59 Id. at 666. 
60 Id. at 673. 
61 Id. 
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For example, in Gallo-Chamorro v. United States,62  the defendant was 
extradited from Colombia under an indictment charging him with one 
count of importation of cocaine, one count of conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine, and three counts of distribution of cocaine.63  The decree 
granting the defendant’s extradition indicated that he could not be 
prosecuted as an aider and abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 2.64  At the close of 
the evidence, the government requested a Pinkerton instruction65 with 
respect to the importation count.66  The defendant objected on the 
grounds that he had been extradited as a principal and that the 
instruction sought by the government represented “a ‘constructive 
theory of liability’ to which Colombia would have objected.”67  The 
district court rejected the defendant’s argument, ultimately giving a 
Pinkerton instruction with respect to the importation count as well as 
three distribution counts.68  The defendant was found guilty of the 
importation and distribution counts, but was acquitted of the conspiracy 
count.69  Following his sentence on these counts, the defendant appealed, 
arguing that the district court’s decision to give a Pinkerton instruction 
was reversible error because the theory of vicarious liability embodied in 
that instruction was no different than that of 18 U.S.C. § 2, for which he 
had not been extradited.70 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit ruled that criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2 was not 
synonymous with co-conspirator liability under Pinkerton.71  The court 
                                                 
62 48 F.3d 502, 503 (11th Cir. 1995). 
63 Id. 
64 Id.  Section 2 states: 
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, 
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is 
punishable as a principal. 
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly 
performed by him or another would be an offense against the United 
States, is punishable as a principal. 
18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
65 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).  This jury instruction is rooted in the 
holding of Pinkerton, in which the Supreme Court ruled that a conspirator could be guilty 
of a substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator, even though he did nothing more 
than join the conspiracy, if the offense was reasonably foreseeable and was committed in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.  Id. at 647–48. 
66 Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d at 504 n.2.  The importation count in the indictment indicated 
that someone, other than the defendant, had actually transported the cocaine into the 
United States.  Id. 
67 Id. at 504. 
68 Id. at 504–05. 
69 Id. at 505. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 506–07. 
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reasoned that “Pinkerton liability, which requires the defendant’s 
participation in a conspiracy, is much narrower in scope than aiding and 
abetting.”72  Consequently, there was no violation of the rule of specialty, 
and the district court had not erred in giving the Pinkerton instruction to 
the jury.73 
After the denial of his appeal, the defendant filed a habeas petition 
requesting that his sentence be vacated, presenting a variant of the 
argument that he had made on direct appeal regarding the district 
court’s decision to give a Pinkerton instruction.74  Specifically, the 
defendant argued in his petition that the Pinkerton instruction had 
violated the specialty doctrine, not because it was analogous to the 
vicarious liability found in 18 U.S.C. § 2, but because Colombia had 
rejected his extradition on the count of the indictment charging him with 
conspiracy to import cocaine.75  On appeal, following the denial of that 
petition, the Eleventh Circuit again rejected his challenge, holding that 
the Pinkerton instruction had not violated the rule of specialty because, in 
this case, that instruction only enabled the government to “establish the 
defendant’s membership in a conspiracy as an evidentiary fact to prove 
guilt in the related substantive offenses.”76  
In support of its ruling, the Eleventh Circuit relied on United States v. 
Thirion.77  In Thirion, Monaco granted the request by the United States for 
the defendant’s extradition on counts charging him with mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and inducing interstate travel to defraud, but not a count charging 
conspiracy to defraud the United States.78  While the defendant was not 
tried on the conspiracy count, the district court instructed the jury on co-
conspirator liability under Pinkerton with respect to the substantive 
counts for which he had been extradited.79  Rejecting the defendant’s 
contention that his convictions could not stand because the doctrine of 
specialty had foreclosed the giving of a Pinkerton instruction, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit first determined that 
“individual substantive counts need not make reference to coconspirator 
                                                 
72 Id. at 507.  In support for this finding, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s 
observation in Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949) that aiding and abetting 
liability is broader in scope than under Pinkerton,  because the former “makes a defendant a 
principal when he consciously shares in any criminal act whether or not there is a 
conspiracy . . . .”  Id. at 507. 
73 Id. at 506. 
74 Gallo-Chamarro v. United States, 233 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2000). 
75 Id. at 1306. 
76 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77 813 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1987). 
78 Id. at 150 & n.4. 
79 Id. at 151.  The substantive counts had charged that defendant was liable as an aider 
and abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).  Id. 
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liability in order for the jury to be so instructed.”80  With this footing in 
place, the court went on to rule that the doctrine of specialty did not 
prohibit the government from seeking to establish a defendant’s 
membership in a conspiracy as an “evidentiary fact to prove guilt” in 
connection with the offenses for which he had been extradited.81 
III.  SENTENCING 
In the federal system, “[a]s a general proposition, a sentencing judge 
‘may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited 
either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from 
which it may come.’”82  This wide discretion is reflected in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence,83  the United States Code,84 and the United States 
                                                 
80 Id. at 152. 
81 Id. at 153.  See also United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 2007) (“As 
Pinkerton liability is an issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the 
defendant of a substantive offense, whether the indictment charged a separate conspiracy 
offense is simply irrelevant.”). 
82 Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 
U.S. 443, 446 (1972)).  See generally Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959) (“[O]nce 
the guilt of the accused has been properly established, the sentencing judge, in determining 
the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed, is not restricted to evidence derived 
from the examination and cross-examination of witnesses in open court . . . .”). 
 The seminal case on sentencing is Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).  In 
Williams, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and the jury recommended 
life imprisonment.  Id. at 242.  The judge imposed a death sentence based on information in 
a probation report indicating that defendant had committed thirty burglaries in the vicinity 
of the murder and that he also had been involved in activities indicating he “possessed ‘a 
morbid sexuality[.]’”  Id. at 244. 
 In rejecting defendant’s contention that the judge’s reliance on this information 
violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment the Court initially 
observed that historically, American and English judges at sentencing had been granted 
“wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to . . . determin[e] the kind and 
extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.”  Id. at 246, 245-46.  In this 
vein, reliance by judges on presentence reports was merely an outgrowth of the “age-old 
practice of seeking [sentencing] information from out-of-court sources to guide their 
judgment toward a more enlightened and just sentence.”  Id. at 250–51.  The Court noted 
that to achieve the goals of reformation and rehabilitation and to insure that the 
punishment fit the crime, “possession of the fullest information possible concerning the 
defendant’s life and characteristics[,]” unfettered by the strict rules of evidence, was 
necessary.  Id. at 247.  Finally, the Court reasoned that under the emerging practice of 
individualized sentencing, a probation officer was not a defendant’s adversary and that 
“most of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent 
imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in 
open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination.”  Id. at 250. 
83 See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3) (rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing).  See 
generally United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 34 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1994) (“In the 
sentencing phase of a case, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply.”). 
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Sentencing Guidelines.85  On a number of occasions, extradited 
defendants have argued that the rule of specialty bars the court’s 
consideration of evidence or other information relating to the charges for 
which their extradition was not granted or sought.  As demonstrated by 
the discussion below, courts uniformly have rejected these arguments. 
A. General Application of Sentencing Principles 
In United States v. Lazarevich,86 the defendant was extradited from the 
Netherlands on charges that he had made false statements on the 
passport applications of his two children.87  The Dutch authorities denied 
this aspect of the request seeking extradition based on charges of child 
abduction because the defendant had already been tried and convicted 
of similar charges by a court in Belgrade.88  The defendant ultimately 
was convicted of making false statements in connection with the 
passport application of one of his children, and he appealed his sentence 
on the ground that the district court’s consideration of the abduction 
charges in enhancing his sentence violated the rule of specialty.89 
Relying on Witte v. United States,90 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the 
district court’s consideration of evidence relating to the defendant’s 
abduction of his children to enhance his sentence within the statutory 
                                                                                                             
84 See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000) (“No limitation shall be placed on the information 
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense 
which a court . . . may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate 
sentence.”). 
85 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (2007) (“In determining the 
sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines 
is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the 
background, character[,] and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by 
law.”); U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a) (“In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the 
sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to 
its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the 
information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”).  In 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Supreme Court ruled that the sentencing 
guidelines, previously mandatory, are now advisory. 
86 147 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1998). 
87 Id. at 1062. 
88 Id. at 1063. 
89 Id. 
90 515 U.S. 389 (1995).  In Witte, the district court determined defendant’s sentence, for 
attempted possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it by considering quantities of 
cocaine that he had imported.  Id. at 393–94.  Subsequently, defendant was indicted for 
conspiracy to import and attempt to import cocaine, and he contended that the indictment 
on those charges “constitute[d] a second attempt to punish him criminally for the same 
cocaine offenses[] . . . .”  Id. at 397.  The Supreme Court ruled that the “use of evidence of 
related criminal conduct to enhance a defendant’s sentence for a separate crime within the 
authorized statutory limits d[id] not constitute punishment . . . .”  Id. at 399. 
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limits did not constitute “punishment” for purposes of the rule of 
specialty.91  The court rejected the contention that merely because the 
sentencing had taken place as a result of an extradition, it was removed 
from the reach of Witte, reasoning that the negotiation of the treaty with 
the Netherlands could not be divorced from its historical background 
which “include[d] the long-standing practice of United States courts . . . 
considering relevant, uncharged evidence at sentencing.”92 
A similar result was reached by the court in United States v. Garcia.93  
In Garcia, following his extradition from Canada, the defendant pled 
guilty to a three-count indictment charging him with conspiracy to 
distribute marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to 
distribute, and using a firearm in connection with the conspiracy.94  At 
the time of sentencing, the district court considered marijuana shipments 
in which the defendant engaged in addition to those to which he had 
pled, and also his complicity in the murder of one of his distributors.95  
Rejecting the defendant’s challenge that consideration of the evidence at 
sentencing violated the doctrine of specialty, the Eleventh Circuit ruled 
that the defendant had not been punished for offenses for which he had 
not been extradited because under the law of the United States, “the 
consideration of other conduct in the sentencing process is legally and 
conceptually a part of the punishment for the inducted crimes and 
within the limits set for those crimes.”96 
In a similar vein, in United States v. Garrido-Santana,97 following his 
conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, the defendant 
appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred when it 
applied an enhancement under the sentencing guidelines for obstruction 
                                                 
91 Lazarevich, 147 F.3d at 1063–64. 
92  Id. at 1064; accord United States v. Fischer, 2007 WL 927948, at *3 (D. Or. 2007) 
(“Petitioner argues that the doctrine of specialty was violated because his criminal history 
was considered in his sentencing, meaning (in petitioner’s view) that he was punished for 
conduct not specified in the extradition agreement.  This argument is rejected.”). 
93 208 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1062 (2001). 
94 Id. at 1260. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 1261.  The court observed: 
With respect to the doctrine of specialty and U.S. law governing 
sentencing[,] the doctrine of specialty does not restrict the scope of 
proof of other crimes that may be considered in the sentencing process.  
The distinction is thus drawn between proof of other crimes as a 
matter germane to the determination of punishment for the extradited 
crime and proof of other crimes in order to exact punishment for those 
other crimes.  Only the latter course is forbidden by the doctrine of 
specialty. 
Id. 
97 360 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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of justice.98  Specifically, the defendant argued that because he had been 
extradited from the Dominican Republic solely on the cocaine offense, 
the district court’s consideration of the external evidence of his failure to 
appear, which further enhanced his sentence, constituted punishment in 
violation of the doctrine of specialty.99  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit assumed arguendo that the treaty could be 
interpreted to contain an implicit promise not to punish, as opposed to 
prosecute, the defendant for any offense for which he had not been 
extradited.100  Adopting the reasoning of  Witte and Lazaravich, the court 
ruled that the “enhancement [of the] . . . defendant’s sentence on the 
narcotics offense based upon [the] defendant’s failure to appear at his 
arraignment did not constitute ‘punishment’ for that conduct so as to 
violate any implicit proscription against such punishment in the 
extradition treaty.”101 
Most recently, in United States v. Angleton,102 the Fifth Circuit 
confronted the issue of the application of the rule of specialty at 
sentencing.  In Angleton, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of 
aiding and abetting the misuse of a passport and one count of conspiracy 
to commit passport fraud.103  The Netherlands had surrendered the 
defendant on these three passport charges, but had refused to grant 
extradition on a murder for hire charge and for failure to appear in 
connection with that charge.104  In calculating the appropriate sentence, 
the district court considered the defendant’s failure to appear, and the 
defendant appealed his conviction, arguing in part that the district 
court’s consideration of such conduct had violated the provision of the 
treaty incorporating the rule of specialty.105  Adopting the reasoning of 
the courts in Lazarevich and Garrido-Santana, the Fifth Circuit rejected this 
contention and ruled that the doctrine of specialty is not infringed by a 
district court’s consideration of relevant conduct under the sentencing 
guidelines associated with a non-extradited offense in assessing the 
appropriate punishment for the offense(s) for which a fugitive was 
surrendered.106 
                                                 
98 Id. at 576. 
99 Id. at 577. 
100 Id. at 578. 
101 Id.; United States v. Robinson, 503 F.3d 522, 530 (6th Cir. 2007) (enhancement for 
obstruction of justice did not violate the rule of specialty). 
102 201 Fed Appx. 238, 2006 WL 2828657 (5th Cir. 2006). 
103 Id. at 239. 
104 Id. at 240. 
105 Id. at 243. 
106 Id. at 243–44.  See generally United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 187 n.2 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(stating in dicta that “the fact that the trial court potentially considered the defendant's 
prior illegal accounting practices in imposing a sentence does not mean that [the 
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B. Forfeiture 
Challenges to the imposition of a forfeiture order on the grounds 
that it violated the rule of specialty have not been well received by the 
courts.  In United States v. Saccoccia,107 discussed above, the defendant 
argued that the forfeiture order, which had been entered pursuant to 
both the money laundering and the RICO charges, violated the rule of 
specialty because it was tantamount to a prosecution and conviction for 
offenses for which the United States had not sought, nor been granted, 
extradition.108  The First Circuit Court rejected this contention holding 
that, for purposes of extradition law, forfeiture was simply “incremental 
punishment” for proscribed conduct, which in the defendant’s case 
involved his conviction for money laundering and the RICO offenses.109 
IV.  LIMITATION ON PUNISHMENT 
On occasion, in response to an extradition request, foreign countries 
have attempted to set a maximum term of imprisonment for the 
extradited fugitive.  Some courts have analyzed disputes surrounding 
compliance with such a limitation as falling within the ambit of the 
doctrine of specialty.110  The following cases illustrate this point. 
In United States v. Cuevas,111 the defendant was extradited from the 
Dominican Republic on narcotics and money laundering offenses.112  
About two weeks after the defendant’s return, the United States received 
a copy of the decree authorizing his extradition.113  The decree 
mentioned that the defendant was covered by the provisions of the 
Dominican Republic’s domestic law which subjected nationals who were 
                                                                                                             
defendant] was punished for those offenses.”).  In addition to Lazarevich and Garrido-
Santana, the court relied on Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1989), where the Eighth 
Circuit held that an increase in the parole release guideline range due to the consideration 
of a non-extradited offense did not violate the doctrine of specialty.  Leighnor, 884 F.2d at 
390.  See Ahmed v. Morton, 1996 WL 118543, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[T]he doctrine of 
specialty does not prohibit the government from introducing evidence at petitioner’s 
parole revocation hearing beyond the scope of the charged offense that may otherwise be 
found to be relevant and admissible by the Parole Commission.”). 
107 58 F.3d 754 (1995). 
108 Id. at 783. 
109 Id. at 784; cf. United States v. Moss, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147–48 (W.D. Tenn. 2004) 
(denying the defense’s motion to dismiss counts in the indictment charging RICO 
substantive and conspiracy charges, as well as forfeiture, because they were based on 
money laundering charges for which Costa Rican authorities had denied extradition, 
reasoning that under Saccoccia, these offenses could be used as predicate acts). 
110 See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas, 496 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2007). 
111 402 F. Supp. 2d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
112 Id. at 505–06. 
113 Id. at 506. 
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extradited to a maximum penalty of thirty years’ imprisonment.114  
Following his guilty plea for the offenses for which he was extradited, 
the district court sentenced the defendant to 390 months’ imprisonment, 
finding that the 30-year cap did not apply because the United States had 
never agreed to this limitation as a condition of the extradition.115 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed the ruling below.116  After recognizing that this case raised the 
application of the rule of specialty in the sentencing context,117 the court 
preliminarily noted that the extradition treaty between the United States 
and the Dominican Republic did not contain any provision limiting 
sentencing.118  The court then found that there was no support in the 
record for the proposition that the United States had ever made any 
substantive assurance to the Dominican Republic that, if extradited, the 
defendant would not be sentenced to more than 30 years’ 
imprisonment.119  Pointing to the normal course of dealings in 
extradition practice, the court observed that generally, when a foreign 
nation seeks to impose a limitation on the sentence that a fugitive may 
receive as a condition to the grant of the extradition request, the foreign 
nation formally seeks assurances from the United States as to this 
limitation through diplomatic channels, by way of a diplomatic note.120  
This gives the United States the opportunity to consider this request and 
if, after consideration of the matter, the United States elects to provide 
such assurance, it conveys its position by way of a diplomatic note to the 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 506–08. 
116 United States v. Cuevas, 496 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2007). 
117 Id.  The court observed: 
Typically, the rule of specialty is invoked to circumscribe the specific 
crimes for which a defendant may be tried following extradition.  
However, the rule of specialty has application in the sentencing 
context as well.  As we held in United States v. Baez, since the cauldron 
of circumstances in which extradition agreements are born implicate 
the foreign relations of the United States, a district court, [i]n 
sentencing a defendant extradited to this country in accordance with a 
diplomatic agreement between the Executive branch and the 
extraditing nation . . . delicately must balance its discretionary 
sentencing decision with the principles of international comity in 
which the rule of specialty sounds.  In more concrete terms, this means 
that a district court should temper [its] discretion in sentencing an 
extradited defendant with deference to the substantive assurances 
made by the United States to an extraditing nation. 
Id. at 262 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 264. 
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foreign nation.121  In Cuevas, the Dominican Republic never requested or 
secured any assurance regarding a limitation on the defendant’s 
sentence; therefore, there was no violation of the rule of specialty when 
the district court imposed a sentence in excess of 30 years’ 
imprisonment.122  
Even when the foreign country has clearly conditioned the surrender 
of the fugitive on a sentencing cap, if it turns him over before obtaining an 
assurance from the United States, no application, much less violation of 
the rule of specialty, will be found if the sentence imposed exceeds the 
limitation.  For example, in Benitez v. Garcia,123 the defendant, a Mexican 
citizen, was convicted of murder in California.124  The United States 
requested the defendant’s extradition from Venezuela and advised the 
authorities that if convicted of first-degree murder he “would receive a 
sentence of incarceration of 25 years to life.”125  The United States-
Venezuela extradition treaty expressly provided that before granting an 
extradition request, the extraditing country had the right to extract 
assurances that “the death penalty or imprisonment for life w[ould] not 
be inflicted[,]”126 and the Venezuelan Supreme Court subsequently 
approved the defendant’s extradition with the proviso that if he was 
ultimately convicted, a sentence of death, life imprisonment, or 
“punishment depriving his freedom for more than thirty years[]” would 
not be imposed.127  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thereafter advised the 
United States that the defendant’s extradition had been approved on the 
                                                 
121 Id.  As the district court aptly noted below, “[d]iplomatic custom demands such 
formality for good reasons:  requiring that conditions of extradition be clearly established 
by diplomatic exchange avoids ambiguity, provides courts with clear evidence of intent, 
and establishes unambiguous guidelines for countries engaged in negotiation.”  United 
States v. Cuevas, 402 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
122 Cuevas, 496 F.3d at 264.  The request for defendant’s extradition was made pursuant to 
a bilateral extradition treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic, as 
well as a multilateral treaty to which both nations were signatories.  Id. at 259.  The court 
rejected defendant’s contention that under the multilateral treaty, the United States was 
bound by the Dominican Republic’s domestic laws, reasoning that “[t]he onus [wa]s on the 
requested State to determine, prior to surrendering the individual, whether extradition is 
permitted under its own laws and treaty obligations.”  Id. at 263; see also United States v. 
Banks, 464 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2006) (while the Dominican Republic’s domestic law 
provides a sentencing limitation when it extradites its own citizens, defendant was unable 
to “point[] to any agreement or undertaking made by the United States to limit his sentence 
or even to a communication from the Dominican Republic to the United States expressing 
an expectation that the sentence would be so limited.”) 
123 495 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2007). 
124 Id. at 642. 
125 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
126 Id. (quoting Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 19–21, 1922, U.S.-Venez., Art. IV, 43 Stat. 1968, 
T.S. No 675). 
127 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/2
2008] Doctrine of Specialty 107 
condition that he would “not be sentenced to [death or] . . . life in prison 
or incarceration for more than thirty (30) years.”128  Shortly thereafter, 
the defendant was extradited to the United States, where he was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to an unspecified sentence of fifteen 
years to life.129 
On appeal from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially 
observed that Rauscher had addressed limitations on charged offenses 
whereas, in this case, the extradition decree attempted “unilaterally to 
limit [defendant]’s sentence.”130  In that regard, the court observed that 
while Venezuela could have refused to surrender the defendant until the 
United States had agreed to the sentencing limitation, it instead opted to 
prematurely relinquish custody of him.131  Declining to find that the 
district court’s refusal to extend the teaching of Rauscher to a unilaterally 
imposed condition was an unreasonable application of the existing law, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus.132 
When a fugitive has been surrendered pursuant to an express 
condition involving a limitation of his possible sentence to which the 
United States has consented, courts (in the Second Circuit) have 
analyzed the agreed upon limitation in ascertaining whether the 
sentence imposed violated the rule of specialty.  For example, in United 
States v. Baez,133 the defendant was extradited from Colombia on four 
counts of an indictment charging him with racketeering, racketeering 
                                                 
128 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
129 Id. at 641–42. 
130 Id. at 644. 
131 Id. 
132 Id.; cf. United States v. Lara, 67 Fed. Appx. 72, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2003) (summarily 
rejecting contention that under specialty doctrine, defendant, who had been extradited 
from Colombia, could only be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment 
authorized for his crimes under Colombian law).  See Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 
(1907).  The Ninth Circuit also reasoned that the district court’s ruling was consistent with 
the teaching of Browne.  Id.  In Browne, defendant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud 
and fled to Canada.  Id. at 310–11.  Because of the limitations in the treaty, the Canadian 
authorities ultimately surrendered defendant for attempting to import certain goods 
without paying full customs duties, an offense for which he had been charged but not tried.  
Id. at 311–12.  When he arrived in the United States, he was sent to prison to serve his 
sentence for conspiracy.  Id. at 316.  The Supreme Court declined to uphold the 
reinstatement of the conviction on the conspiracy charge finding that the treaty “limit[ed] 
the imprisonment as well as the trial to the crime for which extradition had been 
demanded and granted.” Id. at 318. 
133 349 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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conspiracy, and murder in aid of racketeering.134  Following his 
conviction, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.135 
On appeal, the defendant argued that his sentence violated the rule 
of specialty because it contravened the terms of a diplomatic note which 
had been given by the United States to Colombia containing specific 
assurances regarding the imposition of a life sentence.136  In particular, 
after obtaining an assurance from the United States that the death 
penalty would not be sought or imposed, Colombian authorities sought 
a further assurance that the defendant would not be subject to a life 
sentence.137  In response, the United States assured Colombia through a 
diplomatic note that it would not seek such a sentence and that, if one 
was imposed, “the United States executive authority w[ould] take 
appropriate action to formally request that the court commute such 
sentence to a term of years.”138  The defendant was then extradited.139 
Concluding that the district court had not abused its discretion in 
imposing a life sentence, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit found that, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the 
diplomatic note had not unqualifiedly assured the Colombian authorities 
that a life sentence would not be imposed.140  To the contrary, the note 
expressly contemplated this possibility, but assured the authorities that if 
that occurred, the United States would seek to have the sentence reduced 
to a term of years.141  In this case, the prosecutor did just that, but the 
district court declined the request and sentenced the defendant to life.142 
                                                 
134 Id. at 91. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 92. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id.; see United States v. Gonzalez, 275 F. Supp. 2d 483, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (no violation 
of the rule of specialty where diplomatic correspondence indicated that life sentence might 
be imposed in which case Executive would request reduction of that sentence). 
142 Baez, 349 F.3d at 92–93.  While affirming the sentence, the Second Circuit was critical 
of the district court’s apparent view that it was free to “ignore the consequences of an 
extradition agreement between Colombia and the United States because the Judiciary is a 
branch of our tripartite government independent of the Executive branch.”  Id. at 93.  The 
court observed: 
[C]ourts should temper their discretion in sentencing an extradited 
defendant with deference to the substantive assurances made by the 
United States to an extraditing nation.  If anything, such deference may 
well allow the United States to secure the future extradition of other 
individuals because foreign nations would observe that the limitations 
they negotiated with the Executive branch in respect to the prosecution 
of their extradited citizens are being honored.  This is not a surrender 
of the independence of the Judiciary to the Executive branch.  To the 
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Another example involving agreed upon limitations regarding 
sentencing is found in United States v. Campbell.143  There, the defendant 
was convicted of numerous armed robbery and firearms charges 
following his extradition from Costa Rica for these offenses.144  Prior to 
his extradition, Costa Rican authorities sought an assurance from the 
United States that the defendant’s sentence would not exceed fifty years, 
and the United States responded that defendant would “not be 
sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment greater than 50 years.”145  In 
addition, the district court entered an order prior to the defendant’s 
extradition indicating that should he ultimately be convicted, the court 
would not “impose any sentence pursuant to which the defendant 
would serve a term of imprisonment of greater than fifty years.”146  
Following the jury’s verdict, the United States obtained clarification from 
the Costa Rican authorities that the judgment of conviction could 
provide a term of imprisonment greater than fifty years, so long as the 
defendant’s release was guaranteed after he served no more than fifty 
years.147  The district court thereafter sentenced the defendant to 155 
years’ imprisonment, but ordered his release after he served fifty 
years.148 
On appeal, the defendant argued that his 155-year sentence had 
violated the terms of the grant of his extradition because he had received 
a sentence which exceeded fifty years.149  The Second Circuit rejected this 
contention holding that the district court’s order, accompanying its 
judgment, which made clear that the defendant was to serve no more 
than fifty years of the 155-year sentence, fully complied with the terms of 
the extradition grant.150 
                                                                                                             
contrary, it is the classical deference courts afford to the political 
branches in matters of foreign policy. 
Id.   
143 300 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1049 (2003). 
144 Id. at 205. 
145 Id. at 206 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
146 Id. at 206–07 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 205. 
149 Id. at 211. 
150 Id. at 212.  The court in Campbell discussed the doctrine of specialty in its opinion but 
did not directly tie it to its ruling that the sentence imposed had not violated the terms of 
the extradition grant.  But see United States v. Cuevas, 496 F.3d 256, 262 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(court recognized that the “rule of specialty has application in the sentencing context as 
well[]”).  Id. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of specialty firmly establishes “that the requesting state, 
which secures the surrender of a person, can prosecute that person only 
for the offense for which he was surrendered by the requested state or 
else the requesting state must obtain the consent of the surrendering 
state before proceeding on other charges.”151  When applying this rule, 
federal courts have been careful to ensure that it is not “construed to 
permit foreign intrusion into the evidentiary or procedural rules of the 
requisitioning state, as distinguished from limiting the jurisdiction of 
domestic courts to try or punish the fugitive for any crimes committed 
before the extradition, except [for] the crimes for which he was 
extradited.”152  Thus, the rule of specialty has neither been interpreted to 
bar the admission of evidence relating to offenses for which extradition 
was denied to establish predicate acts under RICO and Travel Act 
counts, when extradition was granted for those offenses,153 nor does it 
bar admission of evidence to establish participation in a narcotics 
conspiracy.154  Courts also will not apply the rule of specialty to restrict 
the scope of proof with respect to a conspiracy charge for which 
extradition was granted when the evidence admitted at trial exceeds that 
which was presented to the rendering state at the time the extradition 
request was submitted,155 or to foreclose the government from obtaining 
a Pinkerton instruction in connection with offenses for which the 
defendant was extradited.156 
In the sentencing context, and consistent with well-established 
principles, federal courts continue to exercise wide discretion as to the 
information considered in fashioning an appropriate sentence.  In the 
case of defendants who have been extradited, courts will consider 
                                                 
151 M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION:  UNITED STATES LAW & PRACTICE 
§ 6.1, at 511 (4th ed. 2002); see 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 477, 578 (1987). 
152 United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939, 944 (2d Cir. 1976) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
153 See United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 767–68 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Moss, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147–48 (W.D. Tenn. 2004). 
154 See United States v. Bowe, 221 F.3d 1183, 1191(11th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402, 1413–14 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 
939, 944 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Knowles, 2007 WL 1246026, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
155 See United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1576 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1174 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Monsalve, 1999 WL 
132238, at *1 (2d Cir. 1999); Antwi v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 2d 663, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
156 See Gallo-Chamorro v. United States, 233 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d 502, 506–07 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Thirion, 813 
F.2d 146, 152–53 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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evidence relating to counts for which extradition was not granted157 or 
sought.158  The point made by courts here is that even when analyzing 
the application of the doctrine when punishment, as opposed to 
prosecution, is involved, there is a difference to be “drawn between 
proof of other crimes as a matter germane to the determination of 
punishment for the extradited crime and proof of other crimes in order 
to exact punishment for those other crimes.  Only the latter course is 
forbidden by the doctrine of specialty.”159  And, in defining punishment, 
one circuit has held that an order or forfeiture simply represents 
“incremental punishment” for proscribed conduct not triggering 
application of the rule of specialty when such forfeiture was not 
specifically sought in an extradition request.160 
Finally, some courts have treated challenges by defendants to 
limitations that sending states have requested the United States place on 
the defendant’s sentence when granting extradition as falling within the 
doctrine of specialty.  The developing case law reveals that when that 
limitation was not timely and formally communicated to the United 
States, no violation of the rule of specialty will be found.161  Even when 
the foreign country has clearly sought to condition the surrender of the 
fugitive on a sentencing cap, however, if it turns him over before 
obtaining an assurance from the United States, no application, much less 
violation, of the rule of specialty will be found when the sentence 
imposed exceeds the limitation.162  If the surrender takes place after an 
express sentencing limitation to which the United States consented, 
courts will analyze the agreed upon limitation in ascertaining whether 
the sentence imposed violated the terms of the surrender.163 
                                                 
157 See United States v. Angleton, 201 Fed Appx. 238, 243–44 2006 WL 2828657, at *4 (5th 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Lazarevich, 147 F.3d 1061, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 1998).  See also 
United States v. Fischer, 2007 WL 927948, at *3 (D. Or. 2007). 
158 See United States v. Garrido-Santana, 360 F.3d 565, 577–79 (6th Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Garcia, 208 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1062 
(2001). 
159 Garcia, 208 F.3d at 1261. 
160 See United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 783–84 (1st Cir. 1995). 
161 See United States v. Cuevas, 496 F.3d 256, 263–64 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Banks, 464 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2006). 
162 See Benitez v. Garcia, 459 F.3d 640, 644 (9th Cir. 2007); cf. United States v. Lara, 67 Fed. 
Appx. 72, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2003). 
163 See United States v. Baez, 349 F.3d 90, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Campbell, 
300 F.3d 202, 211–12 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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